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 ‘Emotional, logical... credible?’ 
The Art of Labour Oratory 
 
 
Andrew S Crines and Richard Hayton1 
 
Paper for the 62nd Political Studies Association Annual 
Conference, Belfast, 3-5 April 2012 
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The examination of elite oratory is a significantly under researched area of 
British political analysis. This is due in part to the focus upon groups, 
ideological tendencies, and collective bodies within some of the existing 
literature. This tendency is particularly evident in Labour studies, where 
historians often lean towards a broad conception of Labour as a collective 
movement. Oratorical analysis is thus something of an under-developed field in 
Labour studies. 
 
Within the Labour Party, groups such as the Tribune Group, the Campaign for 
Labour Party Democracy, and the Manifesto Group have emerged as 
organisations committed to pursuing certain positions and/or agendas. Yet 
within such structures, leading elites emerge to champion ideological positions. 
Throughout Labour history, such figures as Aneurin Bevan, Hugh Gaitskell, 
Michael Foot, and Neil Kinnock, amongst others, each aligned themselves to 
an ideological tendency, and sought to uses their oratory to advance it. The 
analysis of these individual orators thus has the potential to be a fruitful field of 
political analysis, adding to our understanding of Labour Party politics and 
groups within it.  
 
In addition to this, the general ‘personalisation’ of politics in Britain over 
recent decades suggests the importance of a rigorous agency-centred political 
analysis. This paper offers a preliminary assessment of Ed Miliband’s 
                                                 
1
 
 Department of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Huddersfield.  
 
performance as an orator, through a tripartite analysis consisting of ethos, 
pathos, and logos. Miliband’s position in the tradition of Labour oratory is 
evaluated and contextualised in relation to previous leading oratorical elites in 
the party.  
Introduction 
The scrutiny of leading oratorical elites remains a surprisingly under researched area of 
British political analysis. Given the importance of understanding political speech, this is a 
significant impediment to a fuller appreciation of the tools deployed by political actors. 
However, it is important to note that a developing research agenda, led by Alan Finlayson 
and James Martin, has highlighted the importance of the analysis of rhetoric in British 
politics. For example, Finlayson and Martin (2008) argue that carefully crafted rhetoric 
has enabled political figures such as Thatcher, Kinnock and Blair emerge as prominent, or 
even dominant, political figures (Finlayson & Martin, 2008, p. 459). That success 
enabled Thatcher and Blair to garner significant electoral traction, whilst Kinnock's 
success can be measured in his ability to reform the Labour party. It is also worth noting 
that despite the evident importance of linguistic analysis, ‘rhetorical and linguistic 
approaches, indeed, interpretivism in general, are not widely accepted approaches to the 
study of contemporary government’ (Finlayson, 2004, p. 529). In terms of rhetoric, this is 
an oversight which Finlayson and Martin have sought to redress. However, Finlayson and 
Martin's approach is rooted in an appropriate study of linguistic content, whilst a focus on 
oratorical delivery is generally beyond the scope of their analysis. Given this, might  
greater consideration of the delivery of rhetoric also be revealing? Whilst Finlayson and 
Martin have developed the study of political rhetoric across a range of leading elites, a 
specific focus upon oratory and the delivery of rhetoric remain largely absent from the 
literature. Consequently, an embrace of oratorical and linguistic delivery within this 
article aims to initiate a remedy to this deficiency. 
 
Whilst appropriately tied to an understanding of political rhetoric by Finlayson and 
Martin, oratorical analysis can be seen as distinct from it. As a particular aspect of 
linguistic analysis, oratory is ‘the art of using words effectively and the practice of that 
art in public speech’ (Bevan, 1986, p.82) The use of words goes beyond the rhetorical 
content of those words. As a skill, powerful oration enables a speaker to extend their 
rhetoric, to communicate it more effectively, and in turn generate substantive impact. As 
such, politicians who have mastered the art of oratory have historically enhanced their 
political career prospects (Clark, 2010) and are more likely to enjoy success in advancing 
their ideological position.  
 
For this oratorical analysis, the focus upon linguistic delivery revolves upon a tripartite 
analysis of leading Labour elites, with Ed Miliband utilised as a contemporary case study. 
The tripartite approach enables a demonstration of the importance of oratory to emerge 
through the prism of ethos (credibility), pathos (emotion), and logos (logic). Each 
provide an insight into a specific aspect of linguistic delivery designed to enhance oratory 
and subsequent reception.  
 
These devices are deployed across a sample of noteworthy orators drawn from across 
Labour's ideological spectrum. This will then be followed by an assessment of Miliband's 
leadership to determine if and how he fits into the tradition of Labour oratory through 
consideration of his impact across three key arenas within British politics: Parliament, the 
media, and the party conference. These are subsequently analysed through the 
aforementioned oratorical devices. By doing so, it becomes possible to determine 
whether Miliband's oratorical style rests within the tradition of Labour oratory, or 
whether his distinctive style represents a divergent form of political communication, 
which legitimises further scrutiny. 
 
On Labour Oratory 
To better place Miliband into his oratorical context as a Labour leader, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the longevity of strong oration in Labour politics over the post-war period. 
This is not to suggest oratory was without impact in the pre-war period, however a fuller 
historical appraisal of Labour oratory is out of scope for this evaluation given the 
contemporary emphasis. Rather, the sampling provides an indicative example of leading 
Labour orators with which to demonstrate the oratorical tradition. 
 
Oratorical impact within the Labour Party can be measured by the ability of the 
individual to advance their ideological arguments through their communicative skills 
within collective groups. Given the extent of such ideological divisions, each leading 
orator would inevitably be compelled by necessity to develop oratorical skills tuned to 
their particular circumstances and context. As Crines (2011) argues, ‘since its founding, 
the Labour Party evolved as a coalition of different views and policy positions in which 
diversities coexisted. This ensured that the Labour Party would be characterised by 
division and debate’ (Crines, 2011, p. 8). Such an environment enabled a range of 
individuals with an eclectic interpretation of ideological perspectives to emerge, framing 
their oratorical skills in the process. For Labour orators, this mechanism acted as a de 
facto oratorical nursery, from which leading figures emerged. As such, the importance of 
division must be seen as highly significant towards generating debate and reinforcing the 
importance of oratorical skill.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, the selected sample consists of Aneurin Bevan, Hugh 
Gaitskell, Michael Foot, and Neil Kinnock.  At different times each of these figures 
delivered notable speeches with significant political consequences, if not in all cases 
subsequent policy attainment. They were also characterised by varied styles of oratory. 
Given this, they provide a useful sampling of oratorical success.2 
 
The first elite orator for consideration is Bevan. His oratory drew mainly upon pathos to 
frame his arguments for a national health service, drawing from the memory of his 
deceased father to push for reform of healthcare in Britain. ‘As he was cradling his 
father... the germ of the NHS was born in his mind’ (Brindley, 23 September 2008). As a 
motivator, this provided an emotional charge, a zeal for social change, expressed through 
Bevan's ardent oratory. The death of his father from a preventable disease helped 
facilitate Bevan’s emergence as a principled political actor, framing his arguments in a 
form of righteous anti-Conservative romanticism that he utilised against those he 
proclaimed to be his ideological enemies. As an illustration, Bevan's pathos is evident in 
a speech he gave to a Labour Party rally on 3 July 1948. Contesting the anti-state position 
of the Conservatives, he argued:  
the Tories are pouring out money in propaganda of all sorts and are hoping by this 
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organised sustained mass suggestion to eradicate from our minds all memory of 
what we went through. But, I warn you young men and women, do not listen to 
what they are saying now. Do not listen to the seductions of Lord Woolton. He is a 
very good salesman. If you are selling shoddy stuff you have to be a good 
salesman. But I warn you they have not changed, or if they have they are slightly 
worse than they were (Bevan, 1948).  
 
Bevan’s roots in the Welsh Labour movement helped him draw strongly from his pathos 
to generate ethos. This form of oratory appealed to this chosen audience, who tended 
more towards an expectation of anti-Conservatism based on a combative motivation. 
Bevan's oratorical performances garnered their ethos from his background in reformist 
socialism, manifest entirely through the Labour Party, targeted towards the forces of 
conservatism. From such audiences, Bevan was able to frame debates and positions 
towards those which reflected his own. As a result of Bevan's oratorical approach, he 
tended to convince his audience of the logos of his arguments without drawing upon 
fiscal realities, preferring the 'rightness' of a chosen cause to carry forward his rhetoric.  
 
Contrasting Bevan's pathos, Hugh Gaitskell's oratory was rooted substantially in logos, 
which brought him into conflict with the emotional romanticism of those on the left. 
Gaitskell's leadership of the Labour party was frustrated by this left-wing pathos, 
articulated initially by Bevan and subsequently Michael Foot, who argued by distancing 
the intention of a future Labour government from the principles stipulated forty years 
earlier, he was ‘taking down the signposts to the promised land’ (Williams, 1979, p.555). 
The left, therefore, argued Gaitskell's reforms were contrary to the thrust of Labour 
politics. In contrast, the Gaitskell and the social democrats defended the proposed 
reforms to the constitution as necessary to enhance the party’s credibility with the 
electorate (Heppell, 2010).  
 
Gaitskell believed that force of argument and the logos of that argument would be 
sufficient to enlighten his opponents of its validity (Brivati, 1999, p. 105). This belief, 
which assumes an educated audience, framed his approach to oratorical delivery. To this 
end, Gaitskell sought to argue logically rather than emotionally, alienating him from a 
significant portion of the Labour movement. Heppell confirms the extent to which 
Gaitskell drew from logos, noting that in the case of Clause IV, a logical argument for 
revision can be identified.  
Gaitskell believed that Clause IV was politically irrelevant and electorally 
unattractive. It was not an accurate expression of the policy goals of a 
forthcoming administration that he would lead. By maintaining its privileged 
position within the constitution of the party, it enabled the Conservatives to 
exploit it and engender fears surrounding the implications of Labour occupying 
power (Heppell, 2010, p. 24). 
This position was put to the Labour conference in 1959 by Gaitskell, where he argued 
that ‘we do not aim to nationalise every private firm or create an endless series of state 
monopolies. While we shall certainly wish to extend public ownership in particular 
directions, as circumstances warrant, our goal is not 100 per cent state ownership’ 
(Gaitskell, 1959). Gaitskell's saw nationalisation as a tool for economic management 
which should be located in practical necessity rather than ideological dogmatism. As 
such, he aimed to shift state ownership from being a default perspective to that of an 
economic remedy. It must be remembered, however, that Gaitksell's dependence on logos 
belied the romanticism of symbolism, leading to his subsequent defeat. For Heppell, this 
approach demonstrated ‘weak tactical sense’ given he ‘managed to deepen the divisions 
within the PLP’, yet it also demonstrates an advocacy for logos over pathos, which 
enhanced his ethos as leader, if not his popularity with Labour members (Heppell, 2010, 
p. 24).  
 
Michael Foot's key oratorical arena was the House of Commons. Foot, as a ferocious 
guardian of the role fulfilled by Parliament and the value of the debates within the 
Commons chamber, tended to deliver his most noteworthy speeches in that forum. In 
terms of oratorical delivery, two such speeches can be credited with having a particularly 
significant impact. The first was a contribution to the Vietnam War debate in 1966, and 
the second concerned the Confidence Motion in 1979. Both were contentious and 
decisive in influencing the potential direction of Wilson and Callaghan's respective 
leaderships, and each provided Foot with a compelling opportunity to orate to a large 
attentive audience.  
 
Foot sought to link pathos with logos in his oratory, giving his arguments both an 
emotional and logical contention. This aimed to ensure the listener committed with their 
heads and hearts to the thrust of his arguments. This oratorical technique enabled him to 
advance his rhetoric, in so doing garnering ethos. In relation to whether British military 
forces should be committed to the theatre of Vietnam, Foot drew from pathos to illustrate 
his belief in the 'shamefulness' of the war, whilst incorporating logos to demonstrate the 
political consequence of participation. Foot argued that:  
...the reason that I would not send troops to Vietnam is that I think it is a 
shameful war, a war which I believe is being fought for the wrong reasons and 
which can never be brought to a successful conclusion. Those, surely, are 
adequate reasons for not sending British troops there. I hope that it will be 
understood by a Government in this country that they cannot send British troops 
to Vietnam, not only on the diplomatic technical grounds which my Right Hon 
Friend adduced but also because if the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in 
response to an American request, were to attempt to send British troops to 
Vietnam they would tear to pieces even the secure majority which they now have 
in the House (Hansard, 1966, p.610). 
Foot highlighted his belief that the Vietnam war lacked clear objectives leading to 
reduced potential for success, conclusions he sought to base on logos. He drew from 
pathos to challenge the subjective morality of the war, and again logos to contend the 
government's majority may be threatened by participation, implying a realist, logical 
rationale for not deploying forces. In so doing, Foot deployed two oratorical techniques 
to enhance the credibility of his argument vis-a-vis Britain distancing itself from the war. 
 
In contrast to the earnest nature of Foot's Vietnam speech, in 1979 he drew more from 
pathos in order to construct a humorous depiction of those seeking to challenge the life of 
the Labour government following the loss of two devolution referenda (Crines, 2011, p. 
104). To that end, Foot characterised the situation as a Conservative victory over the main 
nationalist parties and the Liberal Party. As leader of the House of Commons, Foot sought 
to defend the Labour government, arguing that: 
What the Right Hon Lady has done today is to lead her troops into battle snugly 
concealed behind a Scottish nationalist shield, with the boy David holding her 
hand. I must say to the Right Hon. Lady — and I should like to see her smile 
— that I am even more concerned about the fate of the Right Hon. Gentleman 
than I am about her. She can look after herself. But the Leader of the Liberal 
Party — and I say this with the utmost affection — has passed from rising hope 
to elder statesman without any intervening period whatsoever (Hansard, 1979, 
pp.461-590). 
By drawing from pathos, Foot was able to discredit those who supported the motion by 
highlighting their participation in the Conservative effort to challenge Labour electorally. 
Through discernment of human emotion, Foot also used humour to deride the youth of 
the Liberal Leader, insomuch as suggesting his career had begun and ended with little 
substantial activity in between. Foot's use of pathos to generate humour enabled him to 
characterise the Conservative leader as guileful insomuch as she was able to challenge 
the life of the Labour government with the support of those who would be her natural 
political enemies.  
 
The final example of elite Labour oratory is Neil Kinnock, whose conference speeches 
were used to motivate and challenge the Labour movement directly. Kinnock's oratory 
was rooted in passion, drawn from his background, rooted in his sense of Welsh identity. 
Challenged by the formality of the House of Commons, unlike Foot, this was never his 
chosen arena. Rather, given the extent of division and disunity within the Labour 
movement during his leadership, his was an oratory that emerged during the conferences.  
 
A significant example of pathos, aimed at redefining Labour, was made at the 1985 
Labour conference. This speech enabled him to generate ethos insomuch as his attack on 
the hard left Militant Tendency group resonated amongst both social democratic and 
moderate left wing members. Such had been the growth of hard left groups since 1973 
that the Labour movement was seeking, in the context of the post-1983 electoral defeat, 
realignment with its moderate progressive identity (Crines, 2011). To that end, Kinnock 
attacked those remaining hard left advocates by appealing directly to the moderates, 
saying  
I’ll tell you what happens with impossible promises. You start with far-fetched 
resolutions. They are then pickled into a rigid dogma, a code, and you go 
through the years sticking to that, out-dated, mis-placed, irrelevant to the real 
needs, and you end up in the grotesque chaos of a Labour council hiring taxis to 
scuttle round a city handing out redundancy notices to its own workers. I am 
telling you, no matter how entertaining, how fulfilling to short-term egos you 
can’t play politics with people’s jobs and with people’s services or with their 
homes (Kinnock, 1985). 
Firmly attacking the ideological dogmatism of the hard left, seen to be dominating local 
government in Liverpool, Kinnock drew from his oratorical pathos to highlight their 
incompatibility with the aspirations of the Labour Party, attacking them for their focus on 
ideological irrelevancies. Kinnock's delivery and use of emotion, tied to certain belief in 
his argument, ensured his conference speech substantially united the divisions against the 
hard left. 
 
It must be noted, however that Kinnock's pathos did not extend well beyond the 
conference. In other arena, his ethos as a potential Prime Minister suffered as a result of 
his caricature as a 'Welsh windbag'. Kinnock's capacity to frame his rhetoric in emotional 
imagery perpetuated his caricature amongst his adversaries. In an attempt to generate 
credibility beyond the conference, the imagery of Kinnock's speeches was substantially 
reduced, yet this curtailed the broader impact of his oratory (Leapman, 1987, pp. 183-
184). Kinnock's oratory, most effective in the conference hall, became less efficacious 
when modified for the non-conference audience.  
 
These four oratorical elites provide an indicative example of how leading Labour figures 
advanced their arguments by drawing upon one or more of the oratorical techniques. For 
each, their oratory compelled their audience by drawing upon pathos and logos, which 
contributed to advancing individual ethos. Bevan's ethos drew from his background as a 
working class miner, Gaitskell's intellectualism gave his oratory a compelling logos to 
some, through pathos and humour Foot was able to develop a fierce Parliamentary 
oratorical ability tied to logos, whilst Kinnock's pathos fuelled speeches, driven by the 
sense of anger at those he felt prevented Labour gaining governing ethos, energised his 
audience. It is evident, therefore that oratory framed the advancement of leading elites, 
each with distinctive approaches dependent upon generational contexts, with skilful 
oratory providing the means for ideological success. 
 
The communicative skills, developed by these elites, were formulated through the 
divisions and debates threaded through Labour history. Bevan against Gaitskell, Gaitskell 
against the movement, Foot against the leadership, Kinnock against the Militants; each 
provide an internal ideological division through which each orator is challenged. This 
provided an oratorical nursery which proved necessary for oratorical growth, compelling 
the elite orator to develop mature linguistic skills. As a result, over the course of the post-
war period the Labour Party came to possess oratorical elites drawn from such 
ideological divisions. The question remains, however, to what extent is that process still 
evident within contemporary Labour?  
 
To address this, it is necessary to reflect upon the unifying leaderships of Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown, under which the Labour Party appeared to become more ideologically 
homogeneous. The unity of the Labour Party between 1994 and 2008 ensured that 
individuals did not engage in comparable ideological discourses, instead utilising 
carefully crafted language and ‘displays of ideological unity’ that were designed to reflect 
electoral expectations (White & Wintour, 2005; Fairclough, 2000, p.3). In terms of party 
management, the shift in emphasis was firmly towards unity. Given fewer public 
arguments or public debates occurred, fewer elite orators emerged. The oratorical nursery 
that enabled Bevan, Gaitskell, Foot and Kinnock to emerge ceased to function as fully, 
thereby disabling the ability of the Party to generate convincing oratorical elites. 
 
As a consequence, the oratorical failures presently attributed to Miliband go beyond his 
leadership and more towards a fundamental problem facing contemporary Labour elites. 
Although destructive divisions are incompatible with a mature party of government, 
constructive divisions and debates have historically served Labour well in generating 
figures capable of advancing arguments which have, as illustrated above, proven effective 
in producing apparent political and social change. Given such demonstrated importance 
of oratory in the post-war period, the extent to which the current Labour leader 
demonstrates those skills is worthy of consideration. By again drawing upon ethos, 
pathos, and logos it becomes possible to see whether Ed Miliband demonstrates similar 
oratorical skills that have proven effective amongst previous leading oratorical elites.  
 
The Ethos, Pathos, and Logos of Ed Miliband 
To be convincing, a party leader must have demonstrative communicative abilities which 
present the ideological perspective of that party in a credible fashion. The successful use 
of oratory can help persuade supporters that the leader will be an effective challenger to 
their opponents. However, the extent to which this model fully operates within 
contemporary Labour is uncertain. Accordingly, an assessment of Miliband's potency in 
the areas of oratorical ability linked to his chosen rhetoric is one important indicator of 
his strengths and weaknesses, and future prospects, as Labour leader.  
 
This section of the paper offers an initial appraisal of Miliband’s oratory drawing on the 
concepts of ethos, pathos, and logos. Given his relatively short tenure as Labour leader to 
date this assessment is necessarily preliminary in nature, however we argue that key 
indicators of his oratorical style are already evident. Following this discussion, we then 
consider the implications for Miliband’s leadership more generally. 
  
As the newly elected leader of the Labour Party, Miliband's first conference speech would 
set the scene for his style of leadership. It would be an opportunity to demonstrate ethos, 
and to unify the party following the defeat of the expected heir to the throne, his brother 
David Miliband. As seen with Kinnock, who was able to unify the party through 
successful conference oration, Miliband needed to reach beyond recent divisions and 
unify his party. To that end, Miliband drew upon pathos to unify the conference behind 
the achievements of previous Labour generations, to highlight his conception of 
principled socialism to which he tied historic progress, linked back to contemporary 
optimism. 
We are the heirs to an extraordinary tradition, to great leaders who were above 
all the optimists of history. The optimism of 1945 which built the National 
Health Service and the welfare state. The optimism of Harold Wilson and the 
white heat of technology and the great social reforms of that government. The 
optimism of Tony and Gordon who took on the established thinking and 
reshaped our country. We are the optimists in politics today (Miliband, 2010).  
There, he delivered a carefully crafted speech to the Labour Party conference appealing 
to those party members seeking a renewed Labour Party, linked towards Labour's history 
of social democratic ideals. It was an attempt to use pathos to build ideological bridges to 
ensure unity emerged. 
 
To grow his ethos, he also aimed to connect his audience to the realist agenda by 
highlighting anticipated future difficulties for the party through language that reflected 
the rough political journey ahead. ‘It won't always be easy. You might not always like 
what I have to say. But you have elected me leader and lead I will.’ (Miliband, cited by 
Wintour, 2010). By positioning himself as the responsible leader, Miliband aims to 
convince his audience of his ethos in order to convey his leadership credentials.  
 
After his first successful conference speech, Miliband was praised by commentators for 
his ethos and clear likeable character. Yet there remained ‘real worries about Ed’ because 
he was regarded as ‘unknown to the majority of the public and inexperienced as a senior 
public politician.’ (Anderson, 30.09. 2010). This reflects the unanticipated nature of the 
outcome. These worries were swiftly evaluated by political commentators, who observed 
that ‘Miliband is not yet an orator, he has neither the heft nor the charisma of the best 
leaders’ (Ashley, 28.09.2010). Although his ability to connect through pathos is evident 
through disarming social democratic rhetoric, his failure to connect these positions to the 
wider audience has also been noted.  
 
Miliband's absence of external impact can be attributed to an oratorical disconnect 
between himself and the electorate (New Statesman, 12.01.2012). This disconnect 
prevents his rhetoric from garnering the required external salience. Critics such as 
Richard Heller argue the disconnect as an issue relates to an absence of pathos in his 
speeches, which tend to be structured with linguistic barriers (Heller, 2011). ‘Ed Miliband 
and his speech writers stuffed his peroration with stale politician-language which has 
been heard a million times and has lost all power to stimulate emotion or belief.’ (ibid). 
Given this, Miliband's inability to engage with pathos in a meaningful manner outside of 
his core support based remains a significant hurdle for the Labour leader. Indeed, such a 
hurdle has the potential to undermine Labour's ability to demonstrate a socio-economic 
alternative to the austerity of the Conservative-Liberal coalition. Pathos aims for the 
speaker to draw out vivid imagery, descriptions and concepts – an art which Kinnock 
knew well – in order for the audience to construct a visual idea of the argument. For the 
audience to connect emotionally with the speaker, the orator must connect in their level. 
It is worth remembering that ‘in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from the 
language of everyday life, and the usage approved by the sense of the community’ 
(Cicero, cited by Remer 1999). Miliband's use of dry political terminology acts as a 
barrier to this process and ensures he is unable to advance his rhetoric. 
 
Rational thought, logical argument, and factual evaluation are key aspects which a 
successful orator must utilise. Even emotional orators such as Bevan and Foot sought to 
field their arguments towards logos following a speech drawn from pathos. Miliband's 
use of logos draws upon deductive reasoning to construct a convincing argument, based 
on a initial cause and subsequent effect. For example, his speech against Scottish 
independence presents an argument utilising such a deductive process.  
If the people of Scotland decide to separate, as they can, it would not affect 
Scotland alone. It will affect all of us in the four nations of this country. That is 
why I am here today. So as this campaign begins, we need to understand the 
stakes. Some people, including the First Minister, will tell you it is a battle 
between him and the Prime Minister, between the Government of Scotland and 
the Government of the United Kingdom. So let me say clearly: It is right that the 
people of Scotland decide the rules and timing of this referendum (Miliband, 
2012). 
By highlighting the stakes of the decision, and his logic for unity, Miliband is aiming to 
emphasise the logos for a democratic mandate for an independent Scotland. Miliband 
continued to argue that given ‘unemployment at its highest in 18 years’ and ‘rising food 
and energy prices’, these facts should contribute towards the argument for continued 
unity rather than division (ibid). By drawing from deductive reasoning tied to fiscal 
realities, Miliband seeks to frame his oratory around logos, to convey a logical argument.  
 
More broadly, Miliband's use of logos in his oratory extends to economic matters, 
arguing ‘we can't spend our way to the new economy’ (Kelly, 8.01.2012). Connected to 
the narrative of ‘too far, too fast’, Miliband's leadership aims to critique the speed of 
coalition austerity rather than the concept itself, demonstrating the logos of conceptual 
austerity. Indeed, given Alistair Darling warned Labour's austerity would be ‘tougher and 
deeper’ than those enacted by the Thatcher governing during the 1980s, the logos of 
Miliband's position is broadly accepted as orthodoxy (BBC, 25.03.2010). 
 
The Labour Leadership of Ed Miliband 
To extend this evaluation of Miliband's leadership more fully it is necessary to evaluate 
his leadership across a range of arenas, relating back to the oratorical criteria throughout. 
This will enable a focused evaluation of Miliband's leadership to emerge, drawing from 
the ballast of Miliband's oratorical abilities. 
 
As leader of the opposition, Miliband's rhetoric aims to highlight policy failures of the 
coalition government and, where possible, present an alternative. Yet from the examples 
above, it is possible to discern oratorical failures in this key respect. As yet Miliband has 
struggled to convince, provoke appropriate emotion beyond supporters, or demonstrate 
economic competence as either leader of the opposition or even a potential future Prime 
Minister. Such failings conspire to undermine the future electoral potential of the Labour 
Party, whilst enabling the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties to portray Labour 
as economically incompetent, led by a leader of similar political incompetence. This 
perception is in part perpetuated by oratorical failures in three key arenas, these being the 
House of Commons, media engagement, and to a reduced extent the party conference. 
Each afford Miliband with an opportunity to demonstrate oratorical competence, yet a 
prevailing narrative of incompetence tends to be frequently shown. The focus of this 
analysis will be to evaluate the cause and effect of Miliband's oratorical failures and how 
the shortcomings are manifest. 
 
Immediately upon securing the leadership, Miliband announced that he would set about a 
fundamental shift in Labour philosophy by announcing a 'blank page' approach to 
specific policies. The logos of this decision was to create a clear, definitive break with the 
New Labour period, setting the scene for a new direction. ‘I am talking about change as 
profound as the change New Labour brought, because the world itself has changed 
massively, and we did not really change fundamentally as a party, or come to terms with 
the changes, and have not done so since 1994’ (Public Service, 2010). Reflecting the need 
for reform, Miliband believed that this position would demonstrate ethos. Yet rather than 
show competence, it immediately enabled the Conservative Party to demonstrate 
Miliband's lack of logos, saying ‘Miliband's policy book is full of blank pages’ 
(Goodman, 2011). By declaring Labour had a 'blank page', this immediately led to the 
accusation that Labour had nothing to contribute to debates on economic policy, social 
policy, or foreign affairs. Each of these areas, emerging as key debating grounds, were 
vacated by the Labour leadership, enabling the opposing parties to put forward their 
analysis exclusively to the electorate. By surrendering the agenda to the Conservative-led 
government, Miliband was unable to defend Labour's record, or attack the policies of the 
coalition. For any orator, having little political rhetoric is highly problematic.  
 
In terms of Miliband's Parliamentary performance, his lack of ethos at the despatch box 
also undermines his potential impact. This can be partly attributed to a lack of consistent 
gravitas which an orator needs to command through either pathos or logos. Pitch, diction, 
manner and clarity each contribute to the oratorical technique sought. For Miliband, his 
ethos is undermined by an absence of convincing delivery. Such is Miliband's discomfort 
with Prime Minister's Questions that he has expressed a recent desire for reform, however 
his inability to explore how further undermines his ethos. ‘I find the Westminster village 
gets much more excited about it than the population, I believe. I don't know how to 
change it so I'm not going to make false promises about changing it but I would love to 
change it if I could’ (Miliband, 9 February 2012). The importance of PMQs rests in its 
ability for party leaders to showcase their leadership talents to their backbenchers, of 
which a strong oratorical ability is vital. 
 
Outside of PMQs, it must be noted that Miliband's leadership benefited from an instance 
of prominence when the Parliamentary parties broadly aligned themselves in condemning 
the practices of News International in the phone hacking scandal. Although the three 
main parties united in condemnation, Miliband was effective in drawing upon both 
pathos and logos. His muted oratorical delivery framed the Parliamentary debate, 
reflecting the solemnity of the issues. By adopting a calm approach, combined with 
conciliatory language, Miliband spoke for the House. As a result, he was able to garner a 
degree of post-debate political capital, enhancing his short term ethos.  
He is right to take the position that Rebekah Brooks should go. When such a 
serious cloud hangs over News Corporation, and with the abuses and the 
systematic pattern of deceit that we have seen, does he agree with me—he 
clearly does—that it would be quite wrong for them to expand their stake in the 
British media? Does he further agree that if the House of Commons speaks with 
one voice today—I hope the Prime Minister will come to the debate—Rupert 
Murdoch should drop his bid for BSkyB, recognise that the world has changed, 
and listen to this House of Commons? (Hansard, 13 July 2011). 
Miliband's calm approach, linked to pathos, demonstrated a unity of purpose previously 
demonstrated at his first conference speech. As Hayton argues, ‘Miliband successfully 
seized the political initiative and left the Prime Minister trailing by calling for a public 
inquiry, demanding the resignation of Rebekah Brooks, and tabling a motion calling on 
News Corporation to drop its bid for BSkyB’ (Hayton, 16.07.2011). Such was the 
inherited political capital that Miliband earned an opportunity to potentially reshape his 
leadership and communicate his broader social democratic message to the electorate.  
 
Yet, following on from his moment of prominence, he reverted to a position of failing to 
fully grasp the policy agenda, a necessity as identified by Hayton (2011). As a 
consequence of this failure, Miliband aimed to retain the residual political capital by 
referring to himself as ‘the guy who took on Murdoch’ rather than the provider of 
alternative positions on ‘the economy, public services, and the burgeoning eurozone 
crisis’ (Miliband, 6.01.2012; Hayton, 16.07.2011). As a consequence of this failure to 
carpe diem, Miliband's Parliamentary performances generally remain oratorically 
unconvincing. 
 
Outside of Parliament, Miliband's oratory tends to rely upon a self-referencing technique 
to connect himself to the audience. Use of phrases such as ‘and let me tell you’, ‘but I 
have to tell you’, ‘and let me tell the British people’ illustrate this form of reference 
(Miliband, 27.09.2011). Most prominent when being interviewed by the media, Miliband 
tends towards presenting his view, structuring his arguments as ‘I think it would make a 
difference. I also say don't leave young people out of work, one in five young people out 
of work. What I was going to say was that I sense a real feeling of fear in this country’ 
(BBC, 25 September 2011). As an attempt to connect himself to the electorate, the 
technique has value. However, the consolidated disconnect reduces Miliband's ethos 
insomuch as his arguments do not resonate with the electorate. Given this, Miliband's 
oratorical impact is further reduced. 
 
Across the three arenas, Miliband's success varies. In conference, he is at his best because 
he is able to connect emotionally to a sympathetic audience. That audience anticipates the 
unifying message he delivers, presenting a clear purpose and direction for the Labour 
Party. This is Miliband's most effective oratorical arena. He does less well in the 
Commons because of the more confrontational approach, shining only when unity of 
purpose again emerges (e.g. in the debate surrounding News Corporation). A reliance on 
unity, therefore is necessary for Miliband's oration. In terms of media engagement, 
Miliband is disconnected from the audience by his self-referencing and lack of credibility 
as leader. This can be attributed to the self imposed lack of rhetoric, the lack of broader 
oratorical ability, and the confrontational nature of competitive politics. Miliband 
performs well to a united audience; whilst this may prove an effective tool for party 
management, it is unlikely to prove as effective more broadly.  
 
In summary, Miliband's place in the tradition in Labour oratorical elites is unconvincing. 
As illustrated by the sample of leading Labour orators, successful oratory tends to be 
advanced through division. This enabled Bevan, Gaitskell, Foot and Kinnock to draw 
from the oratorical techniques to frame and advance their arguments. Given the context 
of New Labour unity, it is unsurprising that Miliband's oratorical education would lack 
similar conflicts. However, despite this, Miliband's oratory fails due to a lack of gravitas, 
emotional connection with the audience, an inability to convey a logical argument, which 
leads to a decline of credibility.  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, this paper has argued that oratory is central to the advancement of political 
elites. Given the communication of rhetoric advances ideological trajectories, the 
significance of individual oratory is evident, demonstrated by an indicative sampling of 
leading Labour orators. Such oratorical impact has contributed to the formation of the 
national health service, controversies surrounding the debates over Clause IV, the 
possible role of Britain in the Vietnam War, and the future ideological direction of the 
Labour Party vis-a-vis Militant Tendencies. The use of effective oratory cannot, therefore, 
be understated. Through compelling oratory, leading elites have contributed to issues 
which were determined by the strength of argument, coupled by equally compelling 
rhetoric.  
 
This article has conducted the investigation of oratory through the tripartite approach of 
ethos, pathos, and logos, which enables an insight to emerge as to how the linguistic tools 
are deployed by leading political figures. Emotional truth, logical argument, and the 
credibility generated by the speaker constructs a convincing approach for oratorical 
analysts. Evident in the sampling of Labour elites, such oratorical tools had the potential 
to determine the outcome of political discourses. Yet, the unconvincing nature of 
Miliband's oratory and rhetoric can be attributed to a lack of pathos and logos in key 
arguments, undermining his ethos.  
 
Miliband's areas of success tend to be those where he is orating to his supporters. The 
unifying arena of conference ensures a receptive audience. Given the importance of unity 
throughout the New Labour period, it is unsurprising such conditions prevail as the 
orthodoxy. Yet an understanding of the extent to which such unity retards the growth of 
compelling orators is vital. It is also worth remembering that Miliband garnered 
maximum impact for a short time during the unity he capitalised upon during the 
Parliamentary News Corporation debate. This enables the conclusion his reliance on 
unity, cooperation and agreement subvert the conditions experienced by the elite 
sampling, and also conspire to make Miliband ineffective under the critique of regular 
political heat. Addressing conference, pathos is a benefit, yet addressing the media or 
Parliament, for Miliband it remains unpersuasive. In addition, by adopting the 'blank 
page' approach to policy, Miliband surrendered the debate to his opponents, undermining 
further his ethos as leader.  
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